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Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and
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ABSTRACT
We document a robust cross-sectional positive association across industries between a
measureoftheeconomicefficiencyofcorporateinvestmentandthemagnitudeoffirm-
specific variation in stock returns. This finding is interesting for two reasons, neither
of which is a priori obvious. First, it adds further support to the view that firm-specific
return variation gauges the extent to which information about the firm is quickly and
accurately reflected in share prices. Second, it can be interpreted as evidence that
more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment.
CORPORATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT should be more efficient where stock prices are
more informative. Informed stock prices convey meaningful signals to manage-
ment about the quality of their decisions. They also convey meaningful signals
to the financial markets about the need to intervene when management de-
cisions are poor. Corporate governance mechanisms, such as shareholder law-
suits, executive options, institutional investor pressure, and the market for
corporate control, depend on stock prices. Where stock prices are more infor-
mative,thesemechanismsinducebettercorporategovernance—whichincludes
more efficient capital investment decisions.
Our objective in this paper is to examine empirically whether capital invest-
ment decisions are indeed more efficient where stock prices are more informa-
tive. To do this, we require a measure of the efficiency of investment and a
measure of the informativeness of stock prices.
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To gauge the efficiency of corporate investment, we directly estimate To-
bin’s marginal q ratio, the change in firm value due to unexpected changes in
investment scaled by the expected change in investment, for U.S. industries.
The deviation in Tobin’s marginal q from its optimal level is our measure of
investment efficiency—the smaller the deviation the greater the investment
efficiency.
To gauge the informativeness of stock prices, we follow Morck, Yeung, and
Yu (2000) and consider the magnitude of firm-specific return variation. We
justify this on two grounds: one conceptual and the other empirical. On the
conceptual level, stock variation occurs because of trading by investors with
private information. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) predict that a lower cost of
private information leads to a higher intensity of informed trading, and hence
to what they call “more informative pricing.” Extending their reasoning, we
suggest that, in a given time interval and all else being equal, higher firm-
specific variation stems from more intensive informed trading due to a lower
cost of information, and hence indicates a more informative price. We focus on
firm-specific variation because Roll (1988) shows this could be associated with
trading based on private information. At the empirical level, a growing empir-
ical literature links firm-specific variation to stock price informativeness, e.g.,
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Durnev et al. (2001), and Bushman, Piotroski,
and Smith (2002). We recognize that these conceptual arguments and empirical
studies, which we discuss in detail in the next section, constitute a subtle case
for accepting firm-specific return variation as a proxy for stock price informa-
tiveness that calls for further theoretical development. However, we feel they
nonetheless justify further investigation of this possibility.
We find the proximity of marginal q to its optimal level and the magnitude
of firm-specific return variation to be highly positively correlated across indus-
tries.Thisfindingisnotablefortworeasons.First,itunderscorestheconceptual
arguments and empirical evidence cited above, that firm-specific stock return
variation merits serious consideration as a measure of the informativeness of
stock prices. Second, taking firm-specific variation as a measure of the informa-
tivenessofstockprices,itcanbeinterpretedasevidencethatinformativenessof
stock prices facilitates efficient investment. That is, the information efficiency
of the stock market matters to the real economy.
While we cannot categorically reject alternative possible explanations of our
finding,webelievethemtobelessplausible.Onepossibilityisthatfirm-specific
variationandthedeviationofmarginalqfromitsoptimummighthavecommon
factorshavingnothingtodowiththeinformativenessofstockprices.Weinclude
a long list of control variables, introduced in Section III, to capture such factors.
Our empirical results in Section IV lead us to exclude the most obvious of
these possibilities. Another more abstruse possibility is that high firm-specific
variation is noise or, in the words of Roll (1986), “frenzy unrelated to concrete
information.” In Section IV, we explore this possibility and ultimately reject
it. Intuitively, our measure of the efficiency of capital investment decisions is
actually a measure of how closely investment spending matches a change in
market value. If firm-specific variation reflects investor frenzy, our finding hasCapital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 67
the disturbing implication that capital spending is better aligned with market
value change where market values are less meaningful. We are not aware of
anytheoreticalbasisforpostulatingthatmanagers’capitalbudgetingdecisions
are most aligned with observed market value change when market value is
noisier. We cannot preclude the possibility that further work might expose a
missing factor in our statistical work, or might lead to a theory that explains
why capital budgeting decisions are more aligned with observed market value
changes when stock prices are noisier. However, we believe Ockham’s razor
disfavors these lines of attack.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our firm-specific re-
turn variation variables, while Section II explains our marginal q measure.
Section III describes our empirical estimation techniques and our main con-
trol variables. Section IV presents our empirical results and robustness checks.
SectionVconsidersthevalidityandimplicationsofourinterpretationsofourre-
sults and Section VI concludes. The Appendix describes our data and marginal
q estimation technique in detail.
I. Measuring Firm-specific Return Variation
A. Motivation
We support our use of firm-specific return variation to measure stock price
informativeness with a conceptual argument and with a body of empirical
evidence.
Ontheconceptuallevel,variationinafirm’sstockreturninanygiventimepe-
riod is due to public news and to trading by investors with private information.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980, p. 405) argue that “because [acquiring private]
information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the information which is
available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would receive no
compensation.” In their model, traders invest in a risk-free asset and a single
risky asset, and decide whether or not to pay for private information about the
fundamental value of the risky asset. Grossman and Stiglitz derive the result
that informed trading becomes more prevalent as the cost of private informa-
tion falls, which increases the informativeness of the price system (p. 399). We
take this reasoning a step further, and suggest the following: In a market with
many risky stocks, during any given time interval, information about the fun-
damental values of some firms might be cheap, while information about the
fundamental values of others might be dear. Traders, ceteris paribus, obtain
more private information about the former and less about the latter. Conse-
quently, the stock prices of the former, moving in response to informed trading,
are both more active and more informative than the stock prices of the latter.
Consider decomposing the variation of a firm’s return into a systematic por-
tion, explained by market and industry return, and a firm-specific residual
variation. Roll (1988) shows that firm-specific variation, so defined, is largely
unassociated with public announcements, and argues that firm-specific re-
turn variation is therefore chiefly due to trading by investors with private
information. Accordingly, even if the argument of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)68 The Journal of Finance
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Figure 1. Stock return synchronicity in various countries as measured by the average
R2 of regressions of firm returns on domestic and U.S. market returns.
werenotapplicableto“free”macroeconomicinformationsuchastradeormoney
supply statistics, it surely applies to much of the firm-specific information.
Thus,ifthecostoffirm-specificinformationvariesacrossfirms,ceterisparibus,
the intensity and completeness of trading on private firm-specific information
should also vary. Extending the argument of Roll (1988), we hypothesize that
greater firm-specific variation indicates more intensive informed trading and,
consequently, more informative pricing.
Empirically, a range of evidence already points in this direction.
First, Figure 1 shows the average R2 statistics of regressions of firm-level
stock return on local and U.S. market return using 1995 data for a range of
countries, as reported by Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000). These R2’s are very
low for countries with well-developed financial systems, such as the United
States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, but are very high for emerging mar-
kets such as Poland and China. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show that these
results are clearly not due to differences in country or market size, and that
they are unlikely to be due to more synchronous fundamentals in emerging
economies. They find that government disrespect of private property rights and
lackofshareholderprotectionlawsactuallyexplainthelowleveloffirm-specific
stock return variation. They propose that in countries with less corruption and
better shareholder protection, traders have more incentive to trade based on
firm-specific information. This is consistent with the argument that low av-
erage market model R2’s reflect greater activity by the informed traders, as
posited by Roll (1988).Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 69
Second, Wurgler (2000) shows capital flows to be more responsive to value
addition in countries with less synchronous stock returns. This suggests that
capital moves faster to its highest value uses where stocks move more asyn-
chronously. That is, stock markets in which firm-specific variation is a larger
fraction of total variation are functionally more efficient in the sense of Tobin
(1982).
Third, Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2002) show that stock returns ex-
hibit greater firm-specific return variation in countries with more developed
financial analysis industries and with a freer press.
Fourth, Durnev et al. (2001) show that stock returns predict future earnings
changes more accurately in industries with less synchronous returns, as mea-
sured by market-model R2 statistics. Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn (1987), and
othersintheaccountingliterature,regardsuchpredictivepowerasgaugingthe
“information content” of stock prices. In this sense, stock prices have greater
information content when firm-specific variation is a larger fraction of total
variation.
We believe these conceptual arguments and empirical results justify the use
of firm-specific return variation as an indicator of timely and accurate incorpo-
ration of firm-specific information into stock prices. However, we realize that
this view is based on theoretical conjecture and indirect empirical evidence.
Indeed, Roll (1988) allows that firm-specific return variation may be due to
“investors’ frenzy,” unrelated to information. We therefore remain ecumenical
at the outset, and ultimately let the data suggest an interpretation of firm-
specific return variation.
B. Measuring Firm-speciﬁc Return Variation
This section describes the estimation of our firm-specific return variation
measures. We use daily total returns for 1990 through 1992 for the 4,029 firms
in the intersection of CRSP and COMPUSTAT. These span 196 three-digit
SIC industries. The Appendix provides further details. Since we estimate our
other important variable, the efficiency of corporate investment decisions, us-
ing a 1993-to-1997 panel of annual data for each industry, estimating industry-
average firm-specific variations over this period lets us match predetermined
firm-specific return variation of an industry with the same industry’s invest-
ment efficiency measure, and thereby mitigate endogeneity problems.
We gauge firm-specific return variation by regressing firm j’s return on in-
dustry i, ri, j,t, on market and industry returns, rm,t and ri,t, respectively:
ri, j,t = βj,0 + βj,mrm,t + βj,iri,t + εi, j,t, (1)
where βj,0 is the constant, βj,m and βj,i are regression coefficients and εi, j,t is the
noiseterm.Themarketindexandindustryindicesarevalue-weightedaverages
excluding the firm in question. This exclusion prevents spurious correlations
between firm and industry returns in industries that contain few firms. One
minustheaverageR2 of(1)forallfirmsinanindustrymeasurestheimportance70 The Journal of Finance
of firm-specific return variation in that industry. We use industry aggregate
rather than firm-level estimates to facilitate comparison with our marginal q
estimates which we shall explain below.
Note that we follow Roll (1988) in distinguishing “firm-specific” variation
from the sum of market-related and industry-related variation. For simplicity,
we refer to the latter sum as “systematic” variation. We decompose return vari-
ationinthiswaybecauseRoll(1988)specificallylinksarbitragethatcapitalizes
private information to firm-specific variation, so defined.
A standard variance decomposition lets us express an industry-average R2
as
R2
i =
σ2
m,i
σ2
ε,i + σ2
m,i
, (2)
where
σ2
ε,i =
 
j∈i SSRi, j
 
j∈i Tj
σ2
m,i =
 
j∈i SSMi, j
 
j∈i Tj
(3)
for SSRi, j and SSMi, j, the unexplained and explained variations of (1), respec-
tively. The sums in (3) are scaled by
 
j∈i Tj, the number of daily observations
available in industry i.
Since σ2
ε,i and σ2
m,i have skewness of 2.27 and 3.51, respectively, and kurtoses
of 9.76 and 19.93, respectively, we apply a logarithmic transformation. Both
ln(σ2
ε,i) and ln(σ2
m,i) are more symmetric (skewness =− 0.37, 0.07) and normal
(kurtosis = 3.66, 3.52).
The distribution of 1 − R2
i is also negatively skewed (skewness =− 1.00) and
mildly leptokurtic (kurtosis = 4.79). Moreover, it has the econometrically un-
desirable characteristic of being bounded within the unit interval. As recom-
mended by Theil (1971, Chapter 12), we circumvent the bounded nature of R2
with a logistic transformation of 1 − R2
i ∈ [0, 1] to  i ∈  ,
 i = ln
 
1 − R2
i
R2
i
 
. (4)
We thus use the Greek letter   to denote firm-specific stock return variation
measured relative to variations due to industry- and market-wide variation.
The transformed variable is again less skewed (skewness = 0.03) and less
leptokurtic (kurtosis = 3.80). The hypothesis that  i is normally distributed
cannot be rejected in a standard W-test (p = 0.13).
The transformed variable  i also possesses the useful characteristic that
 i = ln
 
1 − R2
i
R2
i
 
= ln
 
σ2
ε,i
σ2
m,i
 
= ln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
− ln
 
σ2
m,i
 
. (5)Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 71
Intuitively, a higher  i indicates the greater the power of firm-specific vari-
ation, σ2
ε,i, relative to market- and industry-wide variation, σ2
m,i, in explaining
the stock price movements of firms in industry i.
We let ln(σ2
ε,i) denote absolute firm-specific stock return variation, ln(σ2
m,i)
absolute systematic stock return variation, and  i relative firm-specific stock
return variation.
Table I briefly describes these variables, and others used in this study. Panel
A of Table II presents univariate statistics for ln(σ2
ε,i), ln(σ2
m,i), and  i. The
substantial standard deviations and spreads of these three variables attest to
theirsubstantialvariationacrossindustries.Moreover,higherfirm-specificand
systematic return variations tend to occur together (ρ = 0.773, p = 0.00).1
II. Tobin’s Marginal q Ratio
A. Motivation
We now turn to our measure for the proximity of capital budgeting to value
maximization. Optimal capital budgeting requires undertaking all positive ex-
pected net present value (NPV) projects and avoiding all those with negative
expected NPV. The NPV of a project is the present value of the net cash flows,
cft. The project will produce at all future times t less its set-up cost, C0. Thus,
optimal capital budgeting requires undertaking projects if and only if
E[NPV] = E
 
∞  
t=1
cft  
1 + r
 t − C0
 
> 0, (6)
where E is the expectations operator. Under ordinary circumstances, managers
are the decision makers, and the E operator should be based on the manager’s
information set.
TocompareNPVsacrossfirms,wescalebyset-upcost,obtainingprofitability
indexes (PI). Optimality entails undertaking a project if and only if its expected
PI surpasses 1,
Emgt[PI] =
1
C0
Emgt
 
∞  
t=1
cft  
1 + r
 t
 
= 1 +
Emgt[NPV]
C0
> 1, (7)
where we now explicitly use Emgt to denote management’s expectations.
The change in the market value of a firm associated with an unexpected unit
increase in its stock of capital goods (replacement cost) is the firm’s marginal
1 In our sample, examples of high firm-specific stock return variation industries include: “Ap-
parel, Piece Goods, and Notions,”“ Video Tape Rental,”“ Miscellaneous Industrial and Commercial,”
“Periodicals: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing,” and “Miscellaneous Chemical Products.” Ex-
amplesoflowfirm-specificstockreturnvariationindustriesinclude“CombinationElectricandGas,
and Other Utility,”“ Automotive Rental and Leasing,”“ Paperboard Mills,”“ Mailing, Reproduction,
Commercial Art,”“ Women’s, Misses’, Children’s, and Infants.”72 The Journal of Finance
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Tobin’s q ratio, and is denoted by
˙ q =
 V
 K
=
1
C0
E
 
∞  
t=1
cft
(1 + r)t
 
= 1 +
E[NPV]
C0
= E[PI], (8)
where all capital spending during each year is aggregated into a project with
set-up cost C0, cft is the total cash flows this project yields at times t, and E
here reflects investors’ expectations.
Thus, marginal q is investors’ estimate of the marginal project’s profitability
index. Ignoring taxes and other complications, value maximization implies ˙ q =
1. In this idealized situation, ˙ q > 1 implies underinvestment and ˙ q < 1 implies
overinvestment. We discuss the effects of taxes and other complexities on the
threshold ˙ q, here denoted h, after we have explained our estimation of ˙ q.
B. Measuring Tobin’s Marginal q Ratio
We now summarize our estimation procedure (a full description is provided
in the Appendix). We operationalize (8) by writing the marginal q of firm j as
the ratio
˙ qj,t =
Vj,t − Et−1Vj,t
Aj,t − Et−1Aj,t
=
Vj,t − Vj,t−1(1 + ˆ rj,t − ˆ d j,t)
Aj,t − Aj,t−1(1 + ˆ g j,t − ˆ δj,t)
, (9)
where Vj,t and Aj,t are the market value (equity plus debt) and stock of capital
goods, respectively, of firm j at time t, and Et is the expectations operator using
all information extant at time t.2 The expected market value of the firm in
t is its market value in t − 1 augmented by both the expected return from
owning the firm, ˆ rj,t, and its disbursements to investors, ˆ d j,t, which includes
cash dividends, share repurchases, and interest expenses.3 The expected value
of the firm’s capital assets in period t is the value of its capital assets in period
t − 1 augmented by both its expected rate of spending on capital goods, ˆ g j,t,
and the expected depreciation rate on those capital goods, ˆ δj,t.
2 An alternative approach would be to use equity value only as the numerator of marginal q.
This would be consistent with the view that managers maximize shareholder value, rather than
firm value, but ignores many legal requirements that managers consider as of creditors’ interests
as well if bankruptcy is a reasonable possibility. Focusing on equity value also highlights the issue
of whether managers should maximize the value of existing shareholders’ wealth or that of existing
and new shareholders. We assume the latter and also add the value of creditors’ claims in (9), so
that our implicit maximand is Vt rather than shareholder value. However, we shall point out later
that the alternative approach leads to qualitatively similar results.
3 Wecanomitinterestifdebtisassumedtobeperpetualsothatperiodicrepaymentsdonotaffect
the principal. Omitting interest expenses does not affect our results. Since we are calculating the
return from owning the entire firm, not from owning a single share, stock repurchases must be
included as part of cash payments to investors.76 The Journal of Finance
Cross-multiplying and simplifying (9) leads to
V i
j,t − V i
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
=−˙ qj(g j − δj) + ˙ qj
Ai
j,t − Ai
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ rj
V i
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ ξj
Di
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
+ ui
j,t,
(10)
where Dj,t ≡ ˆ d j,tVj,t−1 and ξ allows for a tax wedge. (Theoretically, ξ should be
equal to −1. However, the valuation of dividends, share repurchases, and bond
interest payments may be different from market value changes because of the
difference in the tax brackets of various recipients of disbursement.)
It follows that the coefficient βi
0 of the regression across all firms j in industry
i at times t
 V i
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
= αi + βi
0
 Ai
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
+ βi
1
V i
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ βi
2
Di
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
+ ui
j,t, (11)
is an estimate of an industry-average marginal q. We estimate (11) using the
generalized least squares method to allow error correlation across time for each
firm and across firms in each period.
To relate ˙ q to predetermined firm-specific variation (measured from 1990
to 1992), we estimate (11) using a 1993-to-1997 panel of annual data for each
industry. We use industry, not firm-level, ˙ q estimates for two reasons. First,
firm-level estimation of (11) requires many years of data, inducing a survival
bias. Second, using long time windows means that shifting technological con-
straints,marketconditions,andgovernancechangesmightmakeourestimates
unreliable. Since nonsynchronous  Vi
j,t and  Ai
j,t can add noise, we define the
change in firm value according to a firm’s fiscal-year window.4
The average estimated αi, βi
1, and βi
2 also broadly match their interpretations
in (10). The mean and median αi =−˙ qj(g j,t − δj,t) are −0.129 and −0.089,
respectively, and αi differs insignificantly from zero (p < 10%) in 110 of 196
industries. Also, αi is negatively and significantly correlated with estimated
growth rates of capital assets. The mean βi
1, 0.127, implies an average cost of
capitalof12.7percent,themedianβi
1 is0.129.Thesecondregressioncoefficient,
βi
1, is significantly positively correlated with estimated weighted average costs
of capital. The mean and median βi
2 are −0.680 and −0.668, respectively; βi
2
differs significantly from negative one (p < 10%) in 146 of 196 industries.
The sample mean ˙ q is 0.91, and the median is 0.87.5 The correspondence
of capital budgeting to value maximization depends on the distance of ˙ q from
4 The firm value is defined as a fiscal year-end number of common shares outstanding (COM-
PUSTAT, data series #25) times a fiscal year-end common shares price (COMPUSTAT, data series
#199).
5 The five-lowest marginal q industries are: “Asphalt Paving, Roofing Materials,”“ Health Ser-
vices,”“ Chemicals and Allied Products,”“ Fabricated Rubber Products,” and “Accounting, Auditing
and Bookkeeping Services.” The five-highest marginal q industries are: “Power, Distribution, Spe-
cial Transformers,”“ Pens, Pencils, Other Office Materials,”“ Motion Picture Theaters,”“ Mailing,
Reproduction, Commercial Art,” and “Air Transport, Nonscheduled.”Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 77
its optimal value, h, which we initially set to 1. We measure the distance of
˙ qfrom h as either a squared deviation, (˙ q − h)2, or an absolute deviation, |˙ q −
h|. For simplicity, we say (˙ q − h)2 and |˙ q − h| gauge capital budgeting quality,
though they are more properly regarded as measuring investors’ aggregated
opinions about capital budgeting quality; that is, their opinions about corporate
investment efficiency. Panel B of Table II provides summary statistics of ˙ q,
(˙ q − 1)2 and |˙ q − 1| for our 196 industries.
C. Complications
Taxes and other complications can push h, the optimal value of the estimated
˙ q, away from 1. (Let the optimal value of the estimated ˙ q be ˆ ˙ q.) In this section,
we consider these complications, and discuss their importance in this analysis.
First, h may deviate from 1 because of taxes. Suppose a firm unexpectedly
increases its stock of capital assets by plowing back (Aj,t − Et−1Aj,t) of after-
tax corporate earnings. The cost to investors of the firm not disbursing this is
(1 − TD)(Aj,t − Et−1Aj,t), where TD is the personal tax on disbursements. This
gives investors an after-tax capital gain of (1 − TCG)(Vj,t − Et−1Vj,t), where TCG
is the effective personal capital gains tax rate, adjusted for the timing of re-
alizations. For this capital investment to add value, (1 − TCG)(Vj,t − Et−1Vj,t)
must exceed (1 − TD)(Aj,t − Et−1Aj,t). Repeating the algebra used to derive (10)
now yields
V i
j,t − V i
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
= αj + ˙ qj
1 − TD
1 − TCG
Ai
j,t − Ai
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ rj
V i
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ ξj
Di
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
+ ui
j,t. (12)
This means that βi
1 from (11) is actually an estimate of ˙ qj(
1−TD
1−TCG). Reasonable
figures for the 1990s are TD ∼ = 33 percent and TCG ∼ = 14 percent (half the
statutory rate of 28 percent). Assuming the marginal investor is tax-exempt
half of the time, these assumptions imply that ˙ q ∼ = 1.15βi
1, moving our mean ˙ q
to 0.91 × 1.15 = 1.05, and the median to 0.87 × 1.15 = 1.00.
Needless to say, this comparison is further clouded by the corporate tax ad-
vantages from various sorts of capital spending, the endogeneity of capital
structure and disbursement policies, the timing of capital gains realization,
the substitution of repurchases for dividends, and the wide range of personal
tax rates paid by different investors.
Second, capital spending is disclosed annually (unaudited quarterly data are
less reliable), so the aggregation of projects in (9) is unavoidable. If, as condi-
tions change differentially, firms continuously adjust their capital budgeting, ˙ q
should be near one. However, if discrete changes induce large capital budgeting
changes, (9) may capture effects on value of inframarginal, as well as marginal,
capital spending. This should bias ˙ q and h upward.
Third, C0 (in (8)) is unexpected capital spending, but this is unobserved. In
our operationalization in (9), we depict C0 as observed capital spending minus
an implicit estimate of expected capital spending. This estimate may be high
or low, and thus induces noise, but not bias, in ˙ q and hence h.78 The Journal of Finance
Fourth, changes in firm value,  V, may arise from changes in the values of
past investments or future investment options. This adds noise, but not nec-
essarily bias—unless, for example, such options rise in value throughout our
estimation window, inducing an upward bias in ˆ ˙ q and h for growth industries.
A priori, predicting the net effect of these complications is virtually impossi-
ble. However, since each affects observed ˆ ˙ q and thus h similarly, the distances
between ˆ ˙ q and h may still be meaningful, and these are the quantities of pri-
mary interest to us.
III. Empirical Framework
Our empirical objective is to examine the relationship between firm-specific
return variation and the alignment of capital budgeting to market value max-
imization. As we stated in Section II.A, where we motivate the use of firm-
specific return variation as a measure for stock price informativeness, this
variable could conceivably reflect either more or less informed stock prices. In
the former case, greater firm-specific variation should be associated with an
estimated marginal q, βi
0 in (11), closer to its theoretical optimum; the opposite
should hold in the latter case.
Our ˙ q estimates could be affected by a variety of industry factors. There-
fore, we must introduce a set of control variables. In this section, we first re-
port simple correlations and then describe the control variables we use in our
regressions.
A. Simple Correlation Coefﬁcients
Table III reports the simple correlation coefficients between our capital bud-
geting quality measures and our firm-specific stock return variation variables.
Ignoring for the moment taxes and other complications, we interpret (˙ q − 1)2
and |˙ q − 1| as indicators of the deviation of capital budgeting from the opti-
mum.6 Marginal q tends to be nearer one in industries where returns exhibit
both greater absolute firm-specific variation, ln(σ2
ε,i), and greater relative firm-
specific variation,  i. These relationships are statistically significant. Also, the
distance of ˙ q from 1 is insignificantly related to systematic variation, ln(σ2
m,i); ˙ q
itself is uncorrelated with all three return variation measures, ln(σ2
ε,i), ln(σ2
m,i),
and  i.7
Figure 2 illustrates these patterns by grouping industries by their average
R2’s. Regardless of whether we use the mean absolute or squared distance of ˙ q
from one, ˙ q is nearer to 1 in industries with lower R2’s. Figure 3 shows that this
pattern reflects a greater dispersion of ˙ q both above and below 1 in industries
with higher R2’s.
6 Instead of 1, we can take the “optimal” ˆ ˙ q to be the mean (0.91) or the median (0.87) of our
estimated marginal q. The results for the simple correlations and the graphs that we shall depict
in Figures 2 and 3 do not change qualitatively.
7 Marginal q is negatively correlated with (˙ q − 1)2 and |˙ q − 1| because more than 62 percent of
our ˙ q estimates are less than 1.Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 79
Table III
Simple Correlation Coefficients of Capital Budgeting Quality
and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation Variables with Each Other
and with Control Variables
This table reports correlation coefficients based on a 196 three-digit industries sample. Numbers
in parentheses are probability levels at which the null hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected.
Coefficients significant at 10 percent or better (based on the two-tailed test) are in boldface. Refer
to Table I for variable definitions. The return variation measures, σ2
ε , σ2
m, R2, ln(σ2
ε ), ln(σ2
m), and  ,
are constructed using 1990-to-1992 data for 196 three-digit industries spanned by 4,029 firms. The
quality of capital budgeting variables, (˙ q − 1)2 and |˙ q − 1|, are constructed using 1993-to-1997 data
for 196 three-digit industries spanned by 16,735 firm-year observations. The controls, ¯ q, seg, H,
ln(K), λ ¯, lev, adv, and r&d, are constructed using 1990-to-1992 data for 196 three-digit industries
spanned by 4,029 firms. The fundamentals variation controls, ln(ROAσ2
ε ), ln(ROAσ2
m), and ROA ,
are constructed using 1983-to-1992 data for 196 three-digit industries spanned by 4,705 firms. To
utilize as much information as possible to capture fundamental comovements, we include firms
that might not last throughout the period, but had at least 6 years of continuous data. Finance
industries (SIC code 6000–6999) are omitted.
˙ q (˙ q − 1)2 |˙ q − 1| ln(σ2
ε )  
Panel A: Quality of Capital Budgeting Variables
Marginal q ˙ q – −0.249 −0.131 ––
(0.00) (0.07)
Absolute deviation of marginal q from 1 |˙ q − 1| – 0.915 – −0.140 −0.113
(0.00) (0.05) (0.12)
Panel B: Firm-Specific Stock Return Variation
Absolute firm-specific stock ln(σ2
ε ) 0.040 −0.166 –– 0.468
return variation (0.58) (0.02) (0.00)
Relative firm-specific stock   0.025 −0.129 –– –
return variation (0.72) (0.07)
Panel C: Control Variables
Absolute systematic return variation ln(σ2
m) 0.026 −0.091 −0.075 0.773 −0.199
(0.71) (0.20) (0.30) (0.00) (0.01)
Absolute firm-specific ROA variation ln(ROAσ2
ε ) 0.035 −0.059 −0.040 0.608 0.524
(0.62) (0.42) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00)
Absolute systematic ROA variation ln(ROAσ2
m) −0.045 −0.032 0.043 0.624 0.243
(0.53) (0.65) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00)
Relative firm-specific ROA variation ROA  0.122 −0.044 −0.127 0.037 −0.028
(0.09) (0.54) (0.08) (0.61) (0.70)
Average q ¯ q 0.018 −0.079 −0.054 0.308 0.083
(0.80) (0.27) (0.45) (0.00) (0.25)
Corporate diversification segs −0.090 −0.078 −0.095 −0.163 0.060
(0.21) (0.28) (0.18) (0.02) (0.41)
Herfindahl index H −0.134 0.278 0.337 −0.043 0.034
(0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.55) (0.63)
Industry size ln(K) 0.014 −0.282 −0.379 −0.187 −0.037
(0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.61)
Liquidity λ ¯ −0.077 0.041 0.075 0.172 −0.027
(0.29) (0.57) (0.30) (0.02) (0.71)
Leverage lev 0.048 −0.114 −0.068 0.133 0.083
(0.50) (0.11) (0.34) (0.06) (0.25)
Advertising spending adv −0.082 0.022 −0.037 0.170 0.035
(0.26) (0.76) (0.61) (0.02) (0.63)
R&D spending r&d −0.044 −0.025 −0.018 0.012 −0.038
(0.54) (0.73) (0.80) (0.87) (0.59)80 The Journal of Finance
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Figure2.ThedeviationofmarginalTobin’sqfrom1withindustriesgroupedbyindustry-
average firm-level market model R2. A low R2 indicates high firm-specific return variation
relative to market and industry-related variation. The height of each bar is the group average
deviation of marginal q below and above1.
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Figure 3. Mean marginal q for industries subsamples with marginal q above 1 and below
1, grouped by industry-average firm-level market model R2. A low R2 indicates high firm-
specific return variation relative to market and industry-related variation. The height of each bar
is the group mean marginal q. The number of observations in each group is listed at the top of each
bar. The sample sizes for 0% to 10%, 10% to 20%, 20% to 30% and 30% to 40% are 3, 34, 26, and 11
industries with marginal q above 1 and 9, 48, 48, and 7 industries with marginal q below 1.Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 81
B. Multivariate Regression Speciﬁcation
The simple correlations and graphical representations of our data suggest
that greater firm-specific return variation is associated with higher-quality
capital budgeting. To verify whether greater firm-specific return variation is
associated, ceteris paribus, with capital budgeting quality, we control for other
relevant factors.
Our regressions are thus of the form
either (˙ qi − h)2 or |˙ qi − h|=b   + c  · Zi + ui,
either (˙ qi − h)2 or |˙ qi − h|=bε ln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
+ bm ln
 
σ2
m,i
 
+ c  · Zi + ui,
(13)
where Zi is a list of control variables. To mitigate endogeneity problems, the
controls—like return variation—are measures during the period 1990 through
1992. Absolute systematic variation, ln(σ2
m,i), as explained below, is also consid-
ered a control.
We begin by setting h equal to 1. As discussed above, taxes, the discrete-
ness of capital budgeting, the unobservability of expected capital spending, and
changes in expected cash flows from prior or future investments can all push
both estimated ˙ q and h up or down. We therefore reestimate (13) using nonlin-
ear least squares to determine h and the regression coefficients simultaneously.
Appendix A.4 and Amemiya (1985) provide details.
C. Control Variables
The controls are intended to capture several possibilities. First, exogenous
factors might affect the quality of capital budgeting. For example, capital bud-
getingdecisionsmightbebetterinconcentratedindustrieswithhighbarriersto
entrybecauseconditionsinsuchindustriesareeasiertopredict.Notcontrolling
for this obscures the true relationship between capital budgeting quality and
firm-specific return variation by inducing heteroskedastic residuals. Although
we use heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, including controls where
possible is econometrically desirable.
Second, latent common factors related to both capital budgeting quality and
firm-specific return variation might cause a spurious relationship between the
two. Industry concentration again illustrates. Concentrated industries, in ad-
dition to having better-quality capital budgeting decisions, might also contain
homogenous firms whose fundamentals (and therefore stock returns) exhibit
relatively little firm-specific variation. A negative relationship between capital
budgeting quality and firm-specific return variation might simply reflect the
effects of industry concentration on both variables. Several such latent common
factors could affect capital budgeting quality and fundamentals variation.
Note that we do not include corporate governance variables, such as board
structure, ownership structure, and the like. Corporate governance variables
are themselves rough proxies for the alignment of corporate decision-making
with market value maximization, which we estimate directly (at least with
regard to capital budgeting) with ˆ ˙ q. Including corporate governance variables82 The Journal of Finance
would amount to putting proxies for our dependent variable on the right-hand
sideofourregressions.Werelegatetheexaminationoftherelationshipbetween
corporate governance variables, capital budgeting quality and firm-specific
variation to future research.
The next two subsections describe our controls and our reasons for including
each.
C.1. Specialized Control Variables
First, as argued above, industry concentration might matter. We therefore
include a 1990-to-1992 average real-sales-weighted Herfindahl Index, denoted
Hi.
Second, we control for industry size. Firms in large, established industries
might have more internal cash, greater access to capital, and fewer value-
creating investment opportunities. They might therefore be more prone to the
overinvestment problems of Jensen (1986) than firms in smaller industries.
Also, larger industries may be more mature, contain more homogenous firms,
and so exhibit less firm-specific fundamentals variation. Firms in smaller in-
dustriesmightbesubjecttogreaterinformationasymmetryproblems,andthus
be more likely to ration capital and underinvest. We therefore include the loga-
rithmof1990-to-1992industryproperty,plant,andequipment(PP&E),denoted
ln(Ki), as our Industry Size control. The estimation of Ki is explained in detail
in the Appendix equations (A6) and (A7).
Third, a large literature links corporate diversification with both corporate
governance problems and access to capital.8 Also, corporate diversification
might also reduce firm-specific fundamentals variation. Our corporate diver-
siﬁcation measure for industry i, denoted segsi, is the 1990-to-1992 assets-
weighted average diversification level of firms whose primary business is in-
dustry i. Firm diversification is the 1990-to-1992 average number of different
three-digit segments reported in COMPUSTAT Industry Segment file.
Fourth, capital budgeting might be more error-prone in industries where in-
tangible assets are important because the future cash flows they generate are
harder to predict. Moreover, firms in these industries typically have fewer col-
lateralizable assets, and thus may have more difficulty raising external funds.
Also, Shiller (1989) implies that such firms might sometimes exhibit less firm-
specific variation, as during R&D races, and then large firm-specific variation
8 Lewellen (1971) proposes that diversification stabilizes earnings, and helps firms access debt
financingonbetterterms,allelsebeingequal.MatsusakaandNanda(1994)andStein(1997)argue
that the head office of a diversified firm can act like a financial intermediary, investing surplus
funds from one division with positive NPV projects in another, reducing the need for external
funds. Amihud and Lev (1981), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), May (1995), and Khorana and
Zenner (1998) all propose that managerial utility maximization might explain value-destroying
diversification, so more diversified firms might be firms with larger agency problems. Scharfstein
andStein(2000)arguethatdiversifiedfirmsshiftincomefromcash-richdivisionstocash-poorones
out of a sense of “fairness.” Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) propose that such transfers are
due to self-interested divisional managers and weak head offices. Thus, different levels of corporate
diversification could conceivably generate a spurious correlation between financing decisions and
stock return variation in several ways.Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 83
when one wins. We therefore control for industry research and development
spending (R&D) and advertising spending, denoted as r&d and adv, respec-
tively. Both are measured per dollar of tangible assets in each industry, aver-
agedacross1990to1992.TangibleassetsarePP&Eplusinventories,estimated
as in Appendix equation (A5) and the description that follows. We take R&D to
be negligible if not reported and all other financial data are reported.
Fifth, we control for average Tobin’s q, the market value, Vj,t, over replace-
ment cost, Aj,t,
¯ qj,t ≡
Vj,t
Aj,t
, (14)
estimated using 1990-to-1992 data. Besides serving as a general proxy for the
presence of intangibles, ¯ q also measures the importance of growth options.
Changes in these option values during our estimation window could affect both
˙ q and σ2
ε . Note that ¯ q is not the same as ˙ q, marginal q. As a firm invests in
ever more marginally value-increasing projects, its ˙ q falls to 1. Its average q,
however,neednotfallto1,for ¯ q isinvestors’expectedpresentvalueofcashflows
fromallitscapitalinvestments—includingpastinframarginalinvestmentsand
future expected investments—scaled by the sum of the replacement costs of its
existing assets.
To estimate each industry’s ¯ q, we sum the market values of all firms in that
industry, and divide this by the sum of all their replacement costs. The market
value and the replacement costs of tangible assets are as described in the Ap-
pendix. We then average this for each industry during the period 1990 through
1992. Although ¯ q is uncorrelated with ˙ q and negatively (insignificantly) cor-
related with ˙ q’s deviation from 1, it is positively significantly related to both
absolute and relative firm-specific return variation, measured by ln(σ2
ε ) and  .
Sixth, liquidity could affect capital budgeting decisions. For example, cash-
rich firms might overinvest, while cash-strapped firms might ration capital. We
therefore include industry liquidity, 1990-to-1992 industry average net current
assets over PP&E, denoted λi.
Seventh, the existing capital structure might affect capital budgeting.
For example, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage improves corporate
governance—in part, by preventing overinvestment. Others, such as Myers
(1977), argue that various bankruptcy cost constraints distort capital budget-
ing in highly levered firms. Since leverage might also affect fundamentals vari-
ation, we include leverage, levi, 1990-to-1992 industry average long-term debt
over tangible assets (PP&E and real inventory). Details of the estimation of
long-term debt and tangible assets are provided in Appendix A.2.
Eighth, capital budgeting quality may be affected by industry-specific fac-
tors, which the above controls do not fully capture. We therefore add one-digit
industry fixed effects.
C.2. Firm-speciﬁc Fundamentals Variation Control Variables
Unfortunately,myriadindustrycharacteristicsmightaffectfirm-specificfun-
damentals variation, and many cannot be measured readily. Therefore, we84 The Journal of Finance
explicitly control for firm-specific fundamentals variation with two proxies—a
precisely estimated, but indirect measure, and a direct measure that can be
estimated only imprecisely.
Firm-specific changes in fundamental value may be larger and more frequent
in industries where changes in market and industry-related fundamentals are
larger and more frequent. If so, observed systematic variation might be a use-
ful proxy for (unobserved) firm-specific fundamentals variation. We therefore
tentatively interpret absolute systematic return variation, ln(σ2
m), as a proxy
for firm-specific fundamentals variation, and revisit this issue later.
If this interpretation of ln(σ2
m) is valid, using relative, rather than absolute,
firm-specific return variation is an alternative way of controlling for firm-
specific fundamentals variation. Since relative firm-specific return variation,
ψ, is the difference between ln(σ2
ε ) and ln(σ2
m), using ψ as the independent vari-
able is equivalent to using ln(σ2
ε ) as the independent variable and constraining
the coefficient of ln(σ2
m) to be the inverse of the coefficient of ln(σ2
ε ). We therefore
include ln(σ2
m) as a control variable in regressions of absolute firm-specific re-
turn variation, but not in regressions of relative firm-specific return variation.
We can also estimate fundamentals variation directly. Following Morck,
Yeung, and Yu (2000), we construct variables analogous to our stock return
variation measures ln(σ2
ε ), ln(σ2
m), and  , but using the annual return on assets
(ROA) instead of stock returns. We define ROA as net income plus depreciation
plus interest, all divided by tangible assets. The denominator is described in
Appendix equation (A5).
To estimate firm-specific fundamentals variation for each industry, we run
regressions of the form of (1), but using ROA rather than stock returns. That
is, we run
ROAi, j,t = βj,0 + βj,mROAm,t + βj,iROAi,t + εi, j,t (15)
for each firm j in each industry i, with t an annual time index. The dependent
variable, ROAi, j,t is firm j’s ROA, ROAm,t is a value-weighted market average
ROA, and ROAi,t is a value-weighted industry average ROA. Again, we exclude
the firm in question from these averages. We run these regressions on our 1983-
to-1992 sample of nonfinancial firms, described in the Appendix. We drop firms
for which fewer than 6 years of data are available.
We follow the same step-by-step procedure outlined above with regards to (1)
through (5). This variance decomposition lets us express an industry-average
ROAR2 as
ROAR2
i =
ROAσ2
m,i
ROAσ2
ε,i + ROAσ2
m,i
, (16)
where
ROAσ2
ε, j =
 
j∈i SSRi, j
 
j∈i Tj
ROAσ2
m, j =
 
j∈i SSMi, j
 
j∈i Tj
,
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with SSRi, j and SSMi, j now the unexplained and explained variations, respec-
tively, of regression (15) for firm j in industry i. The sum of SSRi, j and of SSMi, j
for industry i is scaled by the number of annual return observations
 
j∈i Tj.
We again apply logarithmic transformations to obtain our absolute firm-
specific fundamentals variation measure, ln(ROAσ2
ε,i), our absolute systematic
fundamentalsvariationmeasure,ln(ROAσ2
m,i),andourrelativefirm-specificfun-
damentals variation measure
ROA i = ln
 
1 − ROAR2
i
ROAR2
i
 
= ln
 
ROAσ2
ε,i
 
− ln
 
ROAσ2
m,i
 
. (18)
Note that we again follow Roll (1988) in distinguishing firm-specific variation
from the sum of market-related and industry-related variation, and we refer to
the latter sum as systematic variation.
Since we have at most 10 annual observations per firm, our variance de-
composition may be imprecise. Using more years reduces the number of usable
firms in each industry, and risks making the fundamentals variation measures
reflect conditions that no longer prevail.
Univariate statistics for these control variables are presented in Panel C of
Table II, and their correlations with the marginal q, and our capital budget-
ing quality measures, the deviations of ˙ q from 1, are presented in the bottom
panel of Table III. Table IV presents the correlations of the control variables
with each other. The absolute value deviation of ˙ q from 1 is negatively corre-
lated with industry size and positively correlated with industry concentration.
Both correlations are highly significant (the p-values are 0.00). With these two
exceptions, our capital budgeting quality variables are uncorrelated with our
control variables.
This suggests that the simple correlation coefficients described above may
in fact be meaningful as tests of our hypotheses. However, even though they
are individually insignificantly correlated with capital budgeting quality, our
control variables may be jointly significant in multiple regressions, to which we
now turn.
IV. Regression Results
A. Main Results
Table V presents regressions of the distance of marginal q from one on firm-
specific stock price variation and the controls. The central result is that higher
firm-specific stock return variation is statistically significantly associated with
marginal q nearer one. This is true whether we measure distance from one as
absolute deviation, |˙ q − 1|, or squared deviation, (˙ q − 1)2. It is also true whether
we measure firm-specific return variation as absolute variation, ln(σ2
ε ), or as
relative variation,  i, and regardless of whether the controls are included or
not. The regression using relative firm-specific variation is weaker though. The
coefficient of interest in regression 4.8 of Table V attains a 9 percent probability
level, while that in regression 4.4 of Table V only achieves 11 percent.86 The Journal of Finance
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Table V ignores taxes and other complications that can bias ˆ ˙ q and thus push
h, the optimal ˙ q, away from 1. When we consider the ways in which taxes and
other factors can raise or lower both ˆ ˙ q and thus h, we note that these factors
mostlikelyaffectour ˙ q estimatesuniformly,oratleastrandomly.Consequently,
our estimated distances between ˆ ˙ q and the similarly distorted optimum, h,m a y
also be distorted uniformly, or at least randomly, and thus can still be used as
an inverse indicator of capital budgeting quality.
Table VI therefore allows the ˙ q threshold value, h, to be estimated endoge-
nously following the nonlinear procedure reported in Appendix A.4. Depending
on the specification, h ranges from 0.715 to 0.908, and the Wald tests show it to
differ significantly from one in all regressions save regression 5.8 of Table VI.
The regression coefficients are similar to those reported in Table V, but have
somewhat higher statistical significance.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the conjecture that greater
firm-specific stock return variation is associated with higher quality capital
budgeting.
B. Robustness
Abatteryofrobustnesschecksgeneratesqualitativelysimilarresultstothose
presented above; that is, an identical pattern of signs and statistical signif-
icance arises across all of the checks. Space constraints limit us to a brief
synopsis.
AlthoughweuseNewey–Westheteroskedasticity-consistentstandarderrors,
outliers could still affect our findings. Hadi’s (1992, 1994) method (cut-off =
0.05) does not reveal outlier problems. Dropping observations for which Cook’s
D is greater than 1 or even 0.5 does not change our findings, nor does dropping
the top and bottom 5 percent of observations of all our main variables.
Wecanestimatemarginalqinavarietyofways.First,wemodify(9),(10),and
(11)toincludeR&Dandadvertiseascapitalexpenditureintheestimationof ˙ q.9
Second, (A7) estimates fixed assets recursively assuming 10 percent economic
depreciation.Analternativeapproachusesaccountingdepreciation,asin(A13).
Third, we estimate ˙ q as the marginal change in shareholder value instead of
firm (equity plus debt) value. Finally, we estimate industry ˙ q including fixed
firm effects, so that each firm has its own expected asset growth rate net of
depreciation, αi in (11). Qualitatively similar results to those in the tables arise
in each case.
We estimate σ2
ε in (1), (2), and (3) using daily data. Some listed firms may be
thinly traded. Nontrading generates zero returns, and a string of zero returns
can artificially raise our estimated σ2
ε . To mitigate this problem, we also use
weekly, bi-weekly, and monthly data. All three procedures generate qualita-
tively similar results to those reported in Tables V and VI.
9 For consistency, this alternative requires that we also capitalize R&D and advertising spending
into the replacement cost of total assets. We assume a 25 percent annual depreciation rate on both
types of intangible investments to do this.90 The Journal of Finance
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We consider alternative constructs for our basic control. First, using
Herfindahl indexes based on assets or employees, rather than sales, gener-
ates similar results. So does controlling for industry size using the logarithms
of 1990-to-1992 average book assets or employees, or using fixed capital es-
timated recursively from reported depreciation, rather than a 10 percent de-
preciation rate. Controlling for liquidity using cash flow over assets and past
external financing (described in Appendix A.3), rather than net current assets
over tangible assets as in (A9), also yields comparable results. So does includ-
ing all three liquidity measures. Finally, we can substitute variants of our basic
fundamentals co-movement variables. For example, we use (A7) to adjust the
denominator of ROA for inflation, construct ROA entirely from book values,
or adjust PP&E with reported depreciation, as in (A13). All these procedures
generate qualitatively similar results to those shown, as do a host of other
variants.10
Another concern is that we miss important industry characteristics. First,
rapidly growing industries, such as high-tech, might exhibit a variety of at-
tributes that bias our ˙ q estimates. Although lagged average q and spending
on intangibles already control for such industries, we can also include current
average q and past stock returns. We also repeat our regressions using only
industries that report zero R&D. Second, because an industry’s exposure to for-
eign trade might affect the quality of capital budgeting, we include industry
exports minus imports over sales and industry capital–labor ratios.11 Third,
firm size might be as important as industry size. Hence, we add average firm
size in each industry: the logarithms of 1990-to-1992 average book assets, real
sales, employees, or PP&E—estimated using either (A7) or (A13). Fourth, reg-
ulated utilities (SIC 4900 through 4999) may be subject to different constraints
10 Dropping observations where |ROAi, j,t − ROAi, j,t−1| > 25 percent to avoid spurs in account-
ing ROA caused by transitory extraordinary events and tax saving practices. Doing so eliminates
869 firm-year observations from our sample. Leaving these observations in does not qualitatively
affect our results. Another straightforward variant is to substitute comovement in return on equity
(ROE), net income plus depreciation all over net worth, for ROA in (18). Constructing this alter-
native fundamentals comovement control variable necessitates dropping four observations where
net worth is negative. Using comovement in ROE to control for fundamentals comovement yields
results similar to those shown in the tables. Also, both ROA and ROE comovement can be esti-
mated relative to an equal, rather than market value, weighting of the indices. Weightings based
on sales, book assets, or book equity also yield qualitatively similar results to those shown in the
tables. An issue with all the above direct measures of fundamentals variation is that while they are
based on a long window, they are unreliable estimates because of changes in firm conditions and
the like. Since our purpose is to estimate how similar fundamentals are among firms, we can use
a panel variance of ROAi, j,t using all firms j in each industry i in 1990 to 1992 as an alternative
control variable. This also produces qualitatively similar results. Using a time-series average of
cross-sectional variances also yields qualitatively similar results.
11 Industriesmoreexposedtointensifiedinternationalcompetitionmaymakebettercapitalbud-
geting decisions. In addition, international competition may have heterogeneous impacts on firm
returns. Industry imports and exports are from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database.
These data are available only for manufacturing (SIC codes from 2000 to 3999) industries, so our
regressionsarerestrictedtotheseindustries.Capital–laborratiosaredeviationsfromtheeconomy-
wide weighted average.Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 93
than unregulated firms despite liberalization in the 1980s. We therefore drop
these industries. All these variations generate results qualitatively similar to
those shown.
We can also ignore statistical propriety and change our empirical specifi-
cation.
First, instead of using 1990-to-1992 return variation and 1993-to-1997
marginal q’s, we can use contemporaneous data from either period. This yields
results qualitatively similar to those shown.
Second, we split our sample by ˙ q. In high-˙ q subsamples (˙ q > 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, or
0.7), regressions analogous to those in Table V, but explaining ˙ q, have signifi-
cant negative coefficients on both ln(σ2
ε ) and  . For low-˙ q subsamples (˙ q < 1.0,
0.9, 0.8, or 0.7), these coefficients are positive and significant. The finding that
˙ q rises with firm-specific return variation in low-˙ q subsamples, but falls with
firm-specific variation in the high-˙ q subsamples, makes it improbable that our
results are artifacts of either liquidity constraints or inframarginal projects.
Inconclusion,ourresultssurviveabatteryofrobustnesschecks.Whileweac-
knowledgethatfurtheranalysismayoverturntheseresults,webelievewehave
presented persuasive evidence that greater firm-specific stock return variation
is associated with marginal q ratios better aligned to value maximization.
C. Economic Signiﬁcance
Our results are highly economically significant. In regression 4.7, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in absolute firm-specific stock return variation, ln(σ2
ε ),
reduces |˙ q − 1| by 0.239 × 0.807 or 0.193, roughly 34 percent of the absolute
distance of marginal q from one across industries. A one standard deviation
increase in relative firm-specific stock return variation,  , reduces the abso-
lute distances of marginal q from one by 14 percent. The improvements, when
measured by the squared distances of marginal q from one, are 28 percent and
13 percent, respectively.
V. Discussion
Our results show capital budgeting to be more aligned with market value
maximization in industries where firm-specific return variation is higher. Our
preferred interpretation of these findings extends the French and Roll (1986)
and Roll (1988) contention that firm-specific variation reflects the intensity of
informed trading with the additional contention that more intense informed
trading is, the closer share prices are to fundamentals. We feel this is the sim-
plest interpretation of our findings, and therefore the preferred interpretation
by Ockham’s razor.
In this section, we weigh alternative interpretations and possible underlying
economic implications of, and explanations for, our preferred interpretation.
A. The Information Content of Stock Prices
Roll (1988) finds that firm-specific return variation is largely unrelated to
publicannouncements,andcontendsthatitreflectsthecapitalizationofprivate94 The Journal of Finance
informationintosharepricesviainformedtrading.However,heconcedes(p.56)
that it might also reflect “occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information.”
We argued above that other research makes the latter interpretation unlikely.
We now consider the plausibility of this interpretation in the context of our
results.
First, greater error in stock prices should cause our ˙ q estimates to deviate
more from their “true” value as assessed by investors. This, ceteris paribus,
would raise the likelihood of finding a positive correlation (not the observed
negative one) between firm-specific return variation and the distance of ˙ q
from h.
Second, more error-laden share prices should cause corporate governance
mechanisms to misfire, and perhaps to be disarmed. Yet capital investment is
more, not less, aligned with market value maximization in higher firm-specific
return variation industries. This is consistent with high firm-specific variation
indicating large pricing errors only if managers’ decisions are more aligned
with shareholder value maximization where share prices are less informed.
This seems improbable.
Third, more erroneous stock prices should magnify information asymmetry
problems, strengthening liquidity constraints. Yet we find less evidence of cap-
ital rationing in high-˙ q industries with larger firm-specific return variation.
Of course, we can never exclude alternative explanations absolutely. For ex-
ample, ˙ q might be higher where capital spending is less predicable. If higher
ln(σ2
ε ) and   are associated with less predictable capital budgeting in low-˙ q
industries (where capital budgeting is already highly predictable), but with
greater predictability in high-˙ q industries (where capital budgeting is already
less predictable), our findings could ensue. Alternatively, capital spending
might become lumpier as ln(σ2
ε ) and   rise for low-˙ q industries, but less lumpy
as ln(σ2
ε ) and   rise for high-˙ q industries. Or, some interaction of such effects
might be devised. While such stories are didactically possible, they are—in our
view—improbable.
If the preferred interpretation of our findings is valid, some inferences follow.
First, our preferred interpretation is also consistent with the use of return
asynchronicity to measure the intensity of informed trading, as implied by
French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988), and as used by Bushman, Piotroski,
and Smith (2002), Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), and others.
Second,ourpreferredinterpretationisconsistentwiththeuseofreturnasyn-
chronicity as a measure of the functional-form efficiency of the stock market,
in the sense of Tobin (1982) and as proposed by Wurgler (2000). Our results
suggest that capital allocation is more aligned with shareholder value maxi-
mization where share prices are more asynchronous. If shareholder value max-
imization, in turn, corresponds to economic efficiency, a positive correlation
between   and higher return asynchronicity follows.
Third, many industries have estimated ˙ q well above our estimated h, and so
appear to underinvest. Many others have ˙ q < h, and so appear to overinvest.
Underinvestmentcouldbeduetoliquidityconstraintsarisingfrominformation
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variety of agency problems, such as Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis or
Roll’s (1988) hubris hypothesis, and become more important when share prices
are less informed. These deviations of ˙ q estimates from h suggest that these
stories are economically important, and that some are more important than
others in specific industries.
This discussion begs the question of how stock prices should track funda-
mentals more closely in industries whose stocks move less synchronously (i.e.,
have higher  ). Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Wurgler (2000), and Bushman,
Piotroski, and Smith (2002) stress differences in institutional environments
acrosscountries.AllU.S.firmsarepresumablysubjecttothesameinstitutional
environment, so cross-industry differences within the United States must be
due to other factors.
B. Incomplete Arbitrage?
In this section, we speculate about how stock prices might come to track
fundamentalsmorecloselyinindustrieswithmoreasynchronousstockreturns.
We do this very tentatively, as we are uncertain of the validity of these ideas,
and we welcome other explanations of our findings.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that arbitrage is limited by the cost of
obtaining and analyzing the information needed to estimate fundamental val-
ues. In addition, they make the point that greater risk aversion of the informed
traderswillalsolimitarbitrageandthuspriceinformativeness(p.399).Shleifer
and Vishny (1997) and Shleifer (2000, Chapter 4) expand on these ideas.
Arbitrageurs’ risk aversion matters because arbitrageurs must hold large undi-
versified portfolios and bear holding period risk—the risk that new information
willsendthepriceinthewrongdirectionbeforethestockpricehastimetomove
to the arbitrageur’s previously correct estimate of its fundamental value. In-
formation gathering, processing costs, and holding period risk matter because
arbitrageurs do not gather and process information if their expected return
from doing so does not justify the cost and risk.
These considerations raise the possibility that arbitrage might be more
severely limited in some industries than in others. We now consider some spe-
cific ways in which this might happen.
B.1. The Absence of Firm-speciﬁc Arbitrage
First, such differences might arise if the basic business activities of firms in
some industries are intrinsically harder for arbitrageurs to predict. If so, arbi-
trage limits might more severely curtail firm-specific arbitrage plays in those
industries. Since French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) find that firm-specific
stock price fluctuations mainly reflect private information being incorporated
into prices by informed trading, an absence of arbitrage on firm-specific infor-
mation might be associated with depressed firm-specific return variation—at
least over short intervals.
Overlongintervals,thecostoffirm-specificinformationaboutdifferentfirms
might rise and fall exogenously. In this case, informed arbitrage on each stock96 The Journal of Finance
would happen when firm-specific information about that stock is cheap. If we
observe stocks for longer time intervals, differences in the extent of informed
trading should wash out. Even if information about some firms is always more
costly than information about other firms, a longer interval might mitigate dif-
ferences in the extent of informed trading. This is because a steadily increasing
divergence of the firm-specific component of a stock return from its funda-
mental value should eventually induce arbitrage, and a consequent discrete
jump as the price finally moves to its fundamental value. That is, uncapitalized
firm-specific information is “built up and discharged.” This capacitance theory
of information capitalization implies that differences in firm-specific return
variation should fade if we measure them over sufficiently long intervals. We
use a 3-year window to estimate ln(σ2
ε ) and  . As we extend our estimation
window, the differences across industries decrease and the statistical signif-
icance of these variables in the regressions falls, though their signs do not
change. A 10-year window is sufficient to render all the coefficients statistically
insignificant.
Unfortunately, this might also merely reflect a greater use of stale data, and
so cannot be taken as clear confirmation of this explanation. We are pursuing
this in a subsequent paper.
However, a lack of firm-specific arbitrage might not lead to a steadily increas-
ing divergence of the share price from its fundamental value if the firm-specific
component of fundamental value is mean reverting. This might occur if firm-
specific differences in returns are due to firm-specific corporate governance
problems, which are corrected over the longer term, or to exceptional firm-
specific corporate governance, which does not last. If old firm-specific informa-
tion grows stale, or depreciates, in this way, an absence of informed trading
might not cause an uncapitalized information build-up. This depreciation the-
ory of information means the gap between true value and market value need
not grow with elapsed time and need not eventually trigger arbitrage. Some
firm-specific events might pass into irrelevance without ever being capitalized
into share prices.
If this hypothesis underlies our results, we might expect the firm-specific
componentofearningstoexhibitmoremeanreversionthanindustryormarket-
wide earnings averages. We are pursuing this possibility in a subsequent
paper.
B.2. Agency Problems and Firm-speciﬁc Arbitrage
A second, closely related possibility is that management might more read-
ily appropriate cash flows in some industries than in others. If management
appropriates abnormally high cash flows due to abnormally high market-wide
or industry-wide earnings, this is obvious to shareholders unless all the man-
agers of other firms do likewise. However, if management appropriates ab-
normally high firm-specific cash flows, shareholders may never know. Arbi-
trageurs, however, might come to rationally expect such appropriations, andCapital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 97
thus view predicting firm-specific fundamentals changes as of little value. If
so, firm-specific return variation would be depressed.
If insiders’ misappropriation raises operating costs, we should see a corre-
sponding effect on firm-specific fundamentals variation, ROAσ2
ε . However, if in-
siders’ pilfering unlinks earnings from dividends, earnings variation might be
unaffected. This effect, however, might be distinguishable as a negative skew-
ness in the firm-specific components of individual stock returns, for insiders
would tend to appropriate positive firm-specific return, but not negative ones.
We are pursuing this possibility elsewhere.
B.3. Noise Traders and Firm-speciﬁc Arbitrage
A third possibility is that noise traders concentrate their trading in certain
“fad” industries. Black (1986) shows that noise traders are required for the
stock market to function. De Long et al. (1990) show that noise trader induced
stockpricemovementsneednotimmediatelybedampenedbyarbitrageurs,and
they argue that this is especially likely when noise traders’ mispricing errors
are systematic. They consequently propose that noise trading induces market-
wide return variation unrelated to fundamentals—which we would observe as
an elevated ln(σ2
m) and a depressed  . This noise trader induced systematic
variation increases the holding period risk that arbitrageurs must bear, and
this deters arbitrage, lowering our measured ln(σ2
ε ) and  .
However, this interpretation would seem inconsistent both with the typical
insignificance of systematic variation, ln(σ2
m), in our results, and with firm-
specific variation relative to systematic variation,  i, not working as well as
absolutefirm-specificvariation,ln(σ2
ε ),insomeoftheourregressions.Nonethe-
less, our incomplete understanding of the real importance and nature of noise
trading prevents a categorical rejection of this hypothesis at present.
B.4. Qualiﬁcation
The idea that different stock prices might track their fundamental values
with different degrees of precision underlies our interpretation of the empirical
findings. If valid, this notion itself is potentially quite important. We recognize
that extensive further empirical investigation is needed to fully ascertain its
validity, and to deduce the nature of the information economics that must un-
derlie it. Moreover, we recognize that our interpretation of the findings may be
erroneous. Consequently, we welcome other explanations of our empirical find-
ing that industries in which stock returns are less synchronous have marginal
q ratios closer to its optimal value.
VI. Conclusions
Our main conclusion is capital budgeting seems more closely aligned with
market value maximization in industries whose stocks exhibit greater98 The Journal of Finance
firm-specificreturnvariation.Thatis,wefindfewermarginalqratiosfarabove
or far below a theoretical optimum in industries exhibiting higher firm-specific
stock return variation. This finding is highly statistically and economically sig-
nificant.Itisalsorobustandsurvivescontrollingforfirm-specificfundamentals
variation and other factors that might affect stock return synchronicity.
This is of interest for several reasons.
First, Roll (1988) attributes the low R2 statistics common in asset pricing
models to high firm-specific return variation, and this firm-specific variation
is not associated with public information releases. He concludes (p. 56) that
it rather reflects “either private information or else occasional frenzy unre-
lated to concrete information.” Our preferred interpretation of the findings is
inconsistent with firm-specific return variation reflecting investor frenzy. In-
deed, our findings imply that firm-specific return variation is due to informed
trading, and that share prices are actually closer to fundamental values where
firm-specific return variation is higher! One possibility is that activity by in-
formed traders reduces noise trader induced errors in share prices, as in De
Long et al. (1990).
Second, the extent to which corporate capital budgeting decisions maximize
market value is a crucial issue in finance. Managers may make capital bud-
geting decisions that do not maximize market value because of corporate gov-
ernance problems associated with managerial self-interest, ignorance, or in-
competence. Suboptimal capital budgeting decisions can also result from costly
external financing (due to information asymmetry between managers and in-
vestors)orothersortsofliquidityconstraints.Ifourinterpretationoftheresults
is correct, firms follow capital budgeting policies more aligned with market
value maximization where stock prices are more informed.
Third, our interpretation of the results raises the possibility that stock prices
track fundamental values with differing degrees of accuracy in different indus-
tries. That is, rather than being “efficient” or “inefficient,” the stock market
exhibits a range of efficiency levels in different industries. How could this be?
We speculate that such differences might arise because arbitrage is complete
to different degrees across industries. But this begs the question of what de-
termines the completeness of arbitrage. We speculate about possible roles for
differences in transparency, arbitrage costs, arbitrage risks, monitoring costs,
agency problems, and noise trading activity. Our findings suggest that a better
understanding of what determines the limits to arbitrage is of fundamental
importance.
Fourth, if we follow Tobin (1982) and define the stock market as functional-
form efﬁcient if stock price movements bring about economically efficient cap-
ital budgeting, our results suggest stock prices are more functionally efficient
where firm-specific return variation is larger. This functional form of the efﬁ-
cient markets hypothesis is important because the quality of corporate capital
allocation decisions has major ramifications for the real economy.
Finally, although we believe this interpretation of our finding is sound, we
recognize that this work is preliminary and we welcome other explanations ofCapital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 99
our finding that greater firm-specific return variation coincides with marginal
Tobin’s q ratios closer to optimal values.
Appendix
A.1. Construction of the Data Sets
Our sample begins with all companies listed in the WRDS CRSP/
COMPUSTAT Merged Database from 1990 to 1992. We discard duplicate en-
tries for preferred stock, class B stock, and the like by deleting entries whose
CRSP CUSIP identifiers append a number other than 10 or 11. Since
accounting data for financial and banking firms (SIC codes from 6000 through
6999) are not comparable, we exclude them.
Since the analysis below requires more than one firm in each industry in
constructing the firm-specific stock return variables, we drop industries that
contain fewer than three firms. We also drop firm-year observations with fewer
than 30 days of daily stock return data. When firms are delisted and
COMPUSTAT indicates that a bankruptcy occurred, we assume a final daily
return of −100 percent. When firms are delisted and COMPUSTAT indicates
that a corporate control event occurred the final return is taken as given.
After these procedures, our final “1990 to 1992 sample” contains 4,066 firms
spanning 205 three-digit SIC industries. We use this sample to construct our
firm-specific stock return variation variables and most of our control
variables.
Constructing some control variables requires a longer panel, starting prior
to 1993. For these, we expand the 1990-to-1992 sample backward to 1983 by
retainingsamplefirmsthatremainlistedinCOMPUSTATintheperioddemar-
catedbythoseyears.This“1983-to-1992sample”contains4,747firmsspanning
204 industries.
We use data from a “1993-to-1997 sample” to construct our capital budget-
ing quality variables. This sample consists of all firms listed in COMPUSTAT
during those years in the industries spanned by our 1990-to-1992 sample. Our
final1993-to-1997samplecontains16,782firm-yearobservationsspanning199
three-digit industries. (The length of this window is arbitrary; our results hold
if we use a shorter data window, e.g., 1993 to 1995.)
WhenCOMPUSTATreportsavalueas“insignificant,”wesetittozero.When
companies change their fiscal years, COMPUSTAT records one fiscal year with
fewer than 12 months and another with more than 12 months. Under some
circumstances, this causes COMPUSTAT to report a missing year observation.
If a firm’s fiscal year ends before June 15, COMPUSTAT reports it as data for
the previous year on the grounds that more than half of the fiscal year occurred
in the previous calendar year. This convention causes missing values if no fiscal
year has the majority of its months in the calendar year of the change. We drop
such firms.
In all three samples, we define industries as sets of firms that share the same
primarythree-digitSICcodeintheCOMPUSTATBusinessSegmentfile.Firms100 The Journal of Finance
need not have data for all time periods to be included in any of the samples.
Hence, ours samples are all unbalanced panels.
A.2. Marginal Tobin’s q Estimation Procedure
We define marginal q as the unexpected change in firm value during period
t divided by the unexpected increase in capital goods during period t. We write
this as
˙ qj =
Vj,t − Et−1Vj,t
Aj,t − Et−1Aj,t
=
Vj,t − Vj,t−1(1 + ˆ rj,t − ˆ dj,t)
Aj,t − Aj,t−1(1 + ˆ gj,t − ˆ δj,t)
, (A1)
where ˆ rj,t istheexpectedreturnfromowningthefirm, ˆ dj,t isthefirm’sexpected
disbursement rate (including cash dividends, share repurchases, and interest
expensive), ˆ gj,t is the expected rate of spending on capital goods, and ˆ δj,t is the
expected depreciation rate on those capital goods.
Rewriting (A1), normalizing by Aj,t−1, we obtain
Vj,t − Vj,t−1 = ˙ qj[Aj,t − Aj,t−1(1 + g j,t − δj,t)] + Vj,t−1(ˆ rj,t − ˆ d j,t), (A2)
or
Vj,t − Vj,t−1
Aj,t−1
=−˙ qj(g j − δj) + ˙ qj
Aj,t − Aj,t−1
Aj,t−1
− ξj
divj,t−1
Aj,t−1
+ rj
Vj,t−1
Aj,t−1
, (A3)
where divj,t−1 is dollar disbursements.
Note that the intercept in (A3) is an estimate of −˙ qj(gj − δj), where the
subscript j indicates a time average. The coefficients of lagged disbursements
and lagged average q can be loosely interpreted as a tax correction factor and
an estimate of the firm’s weighted-average cost of capital.
We estimate Vj,t and Aj,t as
Vj,t = Pt(CSj,t + PSj,t + LTD j,t + SDj,t − STAj,t), (A4)
where
Aj,t ≡ K j,t + INVj,t. (A5)
CSj,t = the end of fiscal year-t market value of the outstanding common
shares of firm j,
PSj,t = the estimated market value of preferred shares (the preferred div-
idends paid over the Moody’s baa preferred dividend yield),
LTDj,t = estimated market value of long-term debt,
SDj,t = book value of short-term debt,
STAj,t = book value of short-term assets,
Pt = inflation adjustment using the GDP deflator,
Kj,t = estimated market value of firm j’s PP&E, and
INV = estimated market value of inventories.Capital Budgeting and Firm-speciﬁc Stock Return Variation 101
Before continuing, we provide details on the estimation of the market values
of long-term debt, PP&E, and inventories.
We estimate the market value of long-term debt recursively. We construct
a 15-year age profile of each firm’s debt each year based on changes in book
values. We estimate the market value of each vintage of each firm’s debt in
each year assuming all bonds to be 15-year coupon bonds issued at par. We use
Moody’s Baa bond rates to proxy for all bond yields.
We use a recursive algorithm to estimate the value of PP&E, Kj,t. This is nec-
essary because historical cost accounting makes simple deflators questionable
in adjusting for inflation. We begin by converting all figures to 1983 dollars. We
assume that physical assets depreciate by 10 percent per year. Let Kj,t−10 be
the book value of net PP&E (in 1983 dollars) for firm j in year t. (If a company’s
history is shorter than 10 years, we start the rolling equation with the first
year available.) Accordingly, PP&E in year t − 9 is then
K j,t−9 = (1 − δ)K j,t−10 +
 X j,t−9
1 + πt−9
. (A6)
More generally, we apply the recursive equation
K j,t+1 = (1 − δ)K j,t +
 X j,t+1
 t+1
τ=0 (1 + πτ)
. (A7)
Thus, PP&E in year t + 1 is PP&E from year t minus 10 percent depreciation
pluscurrentcapitalspending,denotedby Xj,t+1,deflatedto1983dollarsusing
πt, the fractional change in the seasonally adjusted producer price index for
finished goods published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.12
A similar recursive process is sometimes necessary to estimate the market
value of inventories. The market value is taken as equal to the book value
for firms using FIFO accounting. For firms using LIFO accounting, a recursive
process analogous to that described in (A7) is used to estimate the age structure
of inventories. Inventories of each age cohort are then adjusted for inflation
using the GDP deflator.
We partition the 1993-to-1997 sample into three-digit industry subsamples
of firms. For each subsample, we regress
 V i
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
= αi + βi
0
 Ai
j,t
Ai
j,t−1
+ βi
1
V i
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ βi
2
Di
j,t−1
Ai
j,t−1
+ ui
j,t (A8)
to obtain a marginal q estimate, ˙ qi ∼ = βi
0, for that industry; Di
j,t−1 is defined as
dividends for common shares plus repurchases of common shares plus interest
expenses.
12 This index is available at http://www.stls.frb.org/fred/data/ppi/ppifgs.102 The Journal of Finance
Error terms are assumed to satisfy the following conditions: ui
j,t has zero
mean, cov(ui
j,t, ui
j,s)  = 0∀ t and s; and, cov(ui
j,t, ui
k,t)  = 0∀j and k. Equation (A8)
(the same as Equation (11)) is estimated using the GLS method. All variables
are scaled by Ai
j,t−1 to mitigate heteroskedasticity problems.
To mitigate the effect of outliers we drop companies with tangible assets less
than $1 million and with absolute growth rates in tangible assets and value
(scaled by tangible assets) greater than 300 percent. Dropping companies with
absolute values of growth rates greater than 200 percent, 100 percent, or not
dropping them at all does not change our results. We require at least 10 firm-
year observations to estimate (A8). Finally, we omit two industries from our
analysis for which the marginal q takes extremely high values of 4.79 and 6.88.
Keeping them in our sample does not change the results.
The intersection of the “1983 to 1992,”“ 1990 to 1992,” and “1993 to 1997”
samples results in the final sample of 196 three-digit industries we use in our
analysis.
A.3. Additional Variables
Our basic liquidity measure is net current assets as a fraction of total assets
ˆ ¯ λi =
 
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992] current assetsj,t − current liabilitiesj,t
 
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992] tangible assetsj,t
(A9)
for each industry i for the years from 1990 through 1992, where firm j is in
industry i. The denominator is real PP&E, estimated using the recursive pro-
cedure in (A7), plus real inventories.
We define cash ﬂow over total assets as
ci =
 
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992] incomei, j,t + depreciationi, j,t  
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992] tangible assetsi, j,t
, (A10)
where j is an index over firms that are members of industry i. The numerator
is constructed by summing inflation-adjusted 1990, 1991, and 1992 data for
all firms in each industry. The denominator is industry real PP&E, estimated
using the recursive procedure in (A7), plus real inventory.
We define past long-term debt as
ltdi = max
 
0, min
  
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992]  LDj,i
 
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992]  X j,t
,1
  
(A11)
where LDj,t isthebookvalueofnetlong-termdebtissuedbyfirm j inindustry
i during year t ∈ (1990, 1992), as reported in COMPUSTAT. The total value of
capital spending by firm j in industry i in year t ∈ [1990, 1992] is  Xj,t. This
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We analogously define past outside ﬁnancing as
d &ei = max
 
0, min
  
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992] ( LDj,t+ SDj,t +  E j,t)
 
j∈i,t∈[1990,1992]  X j,t
,1
  
(A12)
where  LDj,t and Xj,t are defined as in (A11),  SDj,t is net new short-term debt
and accounts payable from the balance sheets of all firms j in industry i, and
 Ej,t is net new equity issues by all firms j in industry i, both again from 1990
to 1992. This past outside financing variable is again bounded within the unit
interval. In constructing levi and d&ei, we assume new debt or equity to be
nil if these variables are not reported in COMPUSTAT but all major financial
variables are reported.
As an alternative estimate of the total value of property, plant and equipment,
we use reported accounting depreciation each year, DEPj,t, rather than the
assumed 10 percent economic depreciation rate used in (A7). The resulting
recursive formula,
K j,t+1 = K j,t − DEPj,t+1 +
 X j,t+1
 t+1
τ=0 (1 + πτ)
, (A13)
generates an alternative panel of firm-level fixed assets. Using this measure
throughout rather than that from (A7) does not qualitatively change our
findings.
A.4. Nonlinear Estimation in Table VI
Consider a specification with dependent variable the squared deviation of
marginal q from h,
(˙ qi − h)2 = bε ln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
+ bm ln
 
σ2
m,i
 
+ c  · Zi + ui. (A14)
This is equivalent to
˙ q2
i =− h2 + 2h˙ qi + bε ln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
+ bm ln
 
σ2
m,i
 
+ c  · Zi + ui. (A15)
Our aim is to estimate the vector of parameters b ={ h, bε, bm, c } using nonlin-
ear least squares (NLS). In NLS, the following criterion function is minimized
with respect to b:
Qi(b) =
1
I
[y − f(x1, x2, ..., xI;b)] [y − f(x1, x2, ..., xI;b)]
=
1
I
I  
i=1
[yi − f (xi;b)]
2, (A16)104 The Journal of Finance
where yi = ˙ q2
i and f (xi, b) =− h2 + 2h˙ qi + bε ln(σ2
ε,i) + bε ln(σ2
m,i) + c Zi.TheNLS
estimates are computed numerically using the Gauss–Newton algorithm.
Similarly, when the dependent variable is the absolute deviation of the
marginal q from one,
|˙ qi − h|=bε ln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
+ bmln
 
σ2
m,i
 
+ c  · Zi + ui
is equivalent to
˙ q2
i =− h2 + 2h˙ qi +
 
bεln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
+ bmln
 
σ2
m,i
 
+ c  · Zi + ui
 2
because (|x|)2 = x2. In this case we estimate yi = f(xi;b) + εi where yi = ˙ q2
i and
f (xi, b) =− h2 + 2h˙ qi +
 
bεln
 
σ2
ε,i
 
+ bεln
 
σ2
m,i
 
+ c Zi
 2.
Other specifications in Table VI and in the robustness checks section are esti-
mated analogously.
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